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Colliton: Conforming Section 2039 to the Goals of Estate Tax

CONFORMING SECTION 2039 TO THE
GOALS OF ESTATE TAX
JA1VEs W.

COLIrrON*

INTRODUCrION

Internal Revenue Code section 20391 originated in the massive tax law revision that became the 1954 Code. In enacting section 2039 Congress sought
to tax payments received by a decedent's beneficiaries as a result of his em-

ployment. Although its application is not limited to payments made as part
of an employment agreement, the main purpose of section 2039 is to impose the
estate tax on payments made to beneficiaries under employment agreements. 2
Although this purpose is worthwhile, the section's specific provisions have
led to decisions inconsistent with either its legislative history or the general
goals of estate tax law.

Under section 2039(b), an annuity or other payment purchased by the decedent's employer and payable to the decedent's beneficiary is included in the
decedent's estate if the arrangement arose from the decedent's employment and
satisfies the other requirements of section 2039. 3 The estate also includes the

value of annuities or other payments to beneficiaries purchased by the decedent
but excludes those purchased by non-employer third parties. If the decedent
paid only'part of the purchase price of the "annuity or other payment," his
estate includes the proportionate part. Section 2039(c) 4 excludes payments to
*Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law; A.B., 1966, Stanford University;
J.D., 1973, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; LL.M., 1977, Georgetown
University Law Center.
I would like to thank Gayl Hansen for her assistance in preparing this article.
I. I.R.C. § 2039 (1976 & Supp. Il 1979).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4017, at 4117 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.]; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 123 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4621, 4756-57 [hereinafter
cited as S. REP.]. See also Estate of Bahen v. United States, 305 F.2d 827 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Estate
of Beal v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 269 (1966), acq. 1967-2 C.B. 1; Estate of Fusz v. Commissioner,
46 T.C. 214 (1966), acq. 1967-2 C.B. 2; Estate of Barr v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 227 (1963),
acq. in result, 1978-1 C.B. 1. See generally Bittker, Estate and Gift Taxation Under the 1954
Code: The PrincipalChanges, 29 TUL. L. Rv. 453, 470-71 (1955); Kramer, Employee Benefits
and Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 1959 DUKm L.J. 341; Pincus, Estate Taxation of Annuities
and Other Payments, 44 VA. L. REv. 857 (1958); Wolk, The Pure Death Benefit: An Estate
and Gift Tax Anomaly, 66 MINN. L. REv. 229 (1982); Note, The Generic Estate Taxation of
Employee Death Benefits Beyond the Ambit of Section 2039, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 585; Comment,
Internal Revenue Code Section 2039- Estate Taxation of Employee Death Benefits in Nonqualified Retirement Plans, 52 TUL. L. REv. 343 (1978); Comment, The Baptism of Section
2039 - A New Look at Estate Taxation of Employee Death Benefits Under Nonqualified Plans,
10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 619 (1963).
3. I.R.C. 2039(b ) (1976).
4. Id. § 2039(c) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Section 2039(c)'s exclusion of payments to beneficiaries under qualified retirement plans has been generally criticized by commentators be-
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a decedent's beneficiaries arising from a qualified retirement plan. Section
2039, therefore, generally requires inclusion of annuities or other payments to
beneficiaries purchased by the decedent or his employer under non-qualified
plans.
For an annuity or other payment not arising from a qualified retirement
plan to be included in a decedent's estate under section 2039, three conditions
must be met. First, a beneficiary must only receive an annuity or other payment if he survives the decedent. Second, the annuity or other payment must
be made under a contract or agreement other than life insurance. Finally, a
separate annuity must have been payable to the decedent before his death.
Conditions often arise that, although apparently satisfying these requirements, do not create the traditional joint and survivor annuities Congress
sought to address in section 2039. These unanticipated situations, coupled
with the section's poor drafting, create both confusion and litigation concerning the section's scope. This confusion has forced conclusions inconsistent
with either the purpose of section 2039 or the general goals of estate tax law.
The requirement that the decedent have a right to receive some annuity
or other payment before death causes the confusion.5 This article maintains
that the pre-death payment requirement is unnecessary from a policy point
of view and leads to conclusions that are difficult to justify. Section 2039's
legislative history and development, as well as problems caused by the predeath right-to-payment requirement, shows those cases conforming to the
legislative intent underlying section 20396 are inconsistent with the basic
purposes of estate tax law. In contrast, those cases reaching conclusions concause it allows payments that are clearly compensation for the decedent's work to pass tax
free to beneficiaries. See, e.g., A.L.I. FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, REcOMMENDATIONS
AND

REPORTERS'

STUDIES

15-16

(1969); S.

SURREy,

W.

WARREN,

P.

McDANIEL & H.

GUTMAN,

FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION 470-71 (3d ed. 1977); Bittker, supra note 2, at 470-71;
Kramer, supra note 2, at 394-96; Pincus, supra note 2, at 870-71. The IRS has ruled that
benefits accruing under a qualified employee's retirement plan cannot be considered together
with benefits accruing under a nonqualified survivor's income benefit plan for purposes of
determining the includibility of the value of the survivor's benefits in a decedent's gross
estate under § 2039. Rev. Rul. 76-380, 1976-2 C.B. 270, 271. Because of this ruling, a decedent
may receive a retirement annuity under a qualified plan until his death, have a death benefit
paid under a non-qualified plan, and have no estate tax inclusion. This allows significant
amounts of property to be passed tax free and provides planning opportunities. See generally
Wolk, supra note 2, at 234-35.

5. Section 2039(a) provides that:
The gross estate shall include the value of an annuity or other payment receivable by
any beneficiary by reason of surviving the decedent under any form of contract or
agreement . . . (other than as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent), if,
under such contract or agreement, an annuity or other payment was payable to the
decedent, or the decedent possessed the right to receive such annuity or payment, either
alone or in conjunction with another for his life or for any period not ascertainable
without reference to his death, or for any period which does not in fact end before his
death.
I.R.C. § 2039(a) (1976).
6. See, e.g., Estate of Schelberg v. Commissioner, 612 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1979); Estate of
Fusz v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 214 (1966), acq. 1967-2 C.B. 2.
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sistent with basic estate tax principles stretch section 2039 beyond Congress'
apparent intent.7 Finally, this article demonstrates these problems could be
avoided by amending section 2039(a) and eliminating the pre-death payment
requirement.
HISTORY OF SECTION

2039

Congress enacted section 2039 in 1954 to deal with problems that had
arisen under the 1939 Code, which had no counterpart to the section. The
legislative history shows that before the enactment of section 2039, although
the value of joint and survivor annuities purchased by the decedent were
clearly includible in the gross estate, it was unclear whether that type of annuity was included when purchased in whole or part by decedent's employer.8
Congress therefore enacted section 2039 to include such annuities in decedent's
gross estate to the extent of contributions made by him or his employer
through an nonqualified benefit plan. 9 The legislative history shows that taxation of joint and survivor annuities was Congress' primary concern in enacting section 2039.
Before section 2039, courts often excluded employers' payments made to
the decedent's beneficiaries arising from the decedent's employment. 0 In cases
litigated under the 1939 Code, pension plans typically allowed employers discretion to refuse to pay retirement annuities to the employee or his spouse. 11
If employees contributed to the plan, their rights were limited to the return
of payments.' 2 The plans frequently allowed employees to elect a smaller
annuity for life in return for the employer's agreement to pay an annuity to
the employee's surviving spouse. 13 When the employees elected payment to a
surviving spouse, the government would contend the decedent had made a

7. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 1120 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Estate of
Bahen v. United States, 305 F.2d 827 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Estate of Beal v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.
269 (1966), acq. 1967-2 C.B. 1.
8. H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 90.
9. Id.
10. See generally Kramer, supra note 2, at 348 n.19; Pincus, supra note 2.
11. See, e.g., Dimock v, Corwin, 19 F. Supp. 56-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd, 99 F.2d. 799 (2d
Cir. 1938), aJ'd sub inom,United States v. Jacobs, Ex'r, 306 U.S. 363 (1939); Estate of Salt
v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 92, 97 (1951), acq. 1952-1 C.B. 4; Estate of Miller v. Commissioner
14 T.C. 657, 661 (1950), non acq. 1950-2 C.B. 6; Estate of Stake v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 817,
820-21 (1948), acq. 1949-1 C.B. 3. Realistically, employers had to make payments to deceased
employee's beneficiaries because refusal to make such payments would cause employees to feel
they had been unfairly treated. See generally Kramer, supra note 2, at 348-50; Pincus, supra
note 2; Wolk, supra note 2.
12. Employees were often required to make contributions. See, e.g., Estate of Miller v.
Commissioner, 14 T.C. 657, 658 (1950), non acq. 1950-2 C.B. 6; Estate of Stake v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 817, 822 (1948), acq. 1949-1 C.B. 3; Illinois Merchants Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
12 B.T.A. 818, 819 (1928), acq. VIII-1 C.B. 22 (1929).
13. See, e.g., Libbey v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 383, 384 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Estate of
Davis v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 378, 380 (1956); Estate of Howell v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 224,
226 (1950), acq. 1953-1 C.B. 4; Estate of Twogood v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 989, 990 (1950),
aff'd, 194 F.2d 627 (1952), acq. 1953-1 C.B. 6.
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transfer taking effect at death under section 811(c) of the 1939 Code and its
predecessor sections.

14

Although the government persisted in litigating section 811(c) cases,15 courts
often refused to include the annuities in the decedent's estate.' 6 These decisions
rested on the theory that the decedent had no interest in the property passing
to the beneficiary and therefore had transferred nothing.'7 The leading case of
Dimock v. Corwin's typifies the reasoning applied under the 1939 Code. In
Dimock, the decedent had the power to designate beneficiaries to receive death
benefits, although the company reserved the right to withdraw or modify
the annuity plan at its discretion. 19 Because the court held the decedent had
only an expectancy and not a property interest in the amounts paid to his
widow, 20 designation of the beneficiary did not amount to a transfer of
21

property.

14. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(c), 53 Stat. 121 (currently I.R.C. §§ 2035-37). See,
e.g., Glen v. Harmer, 212 F.2d 483, 484 (6th Cir. 1954); Libbey v. United States, 147 F. Supp.
383, 384 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Dimock v. Corwin, 19 F. Supp. 56, 60 (E.D.N.Y. 1937) (property
transfer under § 411(c), predecessor of § 811(c)), afJ'd, 99 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1938), aff'd sub
noma.United States v. Jacobs, Ex'r, 306 U.S. 363 (1939); Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 27
T.C. 378, 379 (1956); Estate of Howell v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 224, 227 (1950), acq. 1953-1
C.B. 4; Estate of Higgs v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 280, 281-82 (1949), rev'd, 184 F.2d 427 (3d
Cir. 1950); Estate of Stake v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 817, 822 (1948), acq. 1949-1 C.B. 3; Estate
of Nevin v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 59, 62 (1948), acq. 1949-1 C.B. 3.
15. See, e.g., Libbey v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Dimock v. Corwin,
19 F. Supp. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd, 99 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1938), aff'd sub noma., United States
v. Jacobs, Ex'r, 306 U.S. 363 (1939); Estate of Howell v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 224 (1950),
acq. 1953-1 C.B. 4; Estate of Miller v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 657 (1950), non acq. 1950-2 C.B.
6; Estate of Stake v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 817 (1948), acq. 1949-1 C.B. 3.
16. See, e.g., Glenn v. Hanner, 212 F.2d 483, 484 (6th Cir. 1954); Libbey v. United States,
147 F. Supp. 383, 385 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Molter v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 497, 501 (E.D.N.Y.
1956); Dimock v. Corwin, 19 F. Supp. 56, 60 (E.D.N.Y. 1937), af'd, 99 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1938),
aff'd sub nom., United States v. Jacobs, Ex'r, 306 U.S. 363 (1939); Estate of Howell v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 224, 231 (1950), acq. 1953-1 C.B. 4; Estate of Miller v. Commissioner, 14
T.C. 657, 665 (1950), non acq. 1950-2 C.B. 6; Estate of Stake v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 817, 826
(1948) (only amounts contributed by decedent includible), acq. 1949-1 C.B. 3; Illinois Merchants
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 818, 827 (1928), acq. VIII-1 C.B. 22 (1929).
17. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 2, at 348 n.19; Bittker, supra note 2, at 470.
18. 19 F. Supp. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd, 99 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1938), aff'd sub nom.,
United States v. Jacob's Ex'r, 306 U.S. 363 (1939).
19. 19 F. Supp. at 58.
20. Id. The district court quoted G.C.M. in support of its conclusions. This G.C.M.,
published before the widespread adoption of retirement plans, stated: "[1]t is clear that the
decedent's interest in the death benefit prior to his death was nothing more than an expectancy, which is not a property right and, therefore, not includible in his gross estate under
section 302(a) as amended." Id., quoting G.C.M. 17817, 1937-1 C.B. 281, 282.
The government tried to retreat from this reasoning in a subsequent opinion, arguing
Dimock should not be followed: "[The employee, at the time of his death, is in possession
of such rights as constitute property . . . provided that prior to the employee's death the
employer has not withdrawn the right of the employee to designate a beneficiary, and has not
eliminated all death benefits." G.C.M. 27242, 1952-1 C.B. 160, 160-61. Although the government
reversed its position, courts continued to follow the Dimock reasoning. See, e.g., Estate of
Howell v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 224, 227-31 (1950), acq. 1953-1 C.B. 4.
21. 19 F. Supp. at 60. The court stated:
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The Dimock court applied traditional property law analysis in deciding
whether the decedent's beneficiary had received property. The court gave weight
to the possibility that under some circumstances, no payment at all would be
made to a beneficiary.22 The court also reasoned that the right to nominate
could not be assigned, sold, or levied upon to satisfy a judgment.2 3 In addition,
if the decedent became bankrupt, his right to nominate would be of no value
to creditors 24
Although one may disagree with the Dimock court's conclusion, whether
an employer's annuity benefits should be included in a decedefit's estate
dearly depended on the existence of a property transfer. As a result of de25
cisions following Dimock's expectancy and transfer analysis, employers were
able to make payments to surviving spouses of deceased employees who were
invariably executives of corporate employers. These payments were not taxed,
although they dearly compensated the employee for services rendered-under
26
the employment agreement.
Section 2039 apparently resulted from congressional belief that these employer payments were sufficiently similar to property owned by the decedent
at death to be included in his estate.2 7 The basic purpose of section 2039 was
[D]uring his life [the decedent had], only the right to render it possible for [decedent's
wife) to receive a grant from the ... [company], and that this did not constitute property
of his . . . and that the act of naming her as the repicient of the death benefit was not
a transfer of property by him to her.

Id.
22. Id. at 59.
23. Id.

24. Id. Dimock clearly illustrates the artificial reasoning courts have used in dealing with
death benefits to employees' beneficiaries:
Here nothing may be payable, if the named beneficiary predeceases the annuitant, but
since a payment did accrue, because the annuitant named a surviving beneficiary,. that
result is to be traced not to a transfer of anything from [the decedent] to his wife,
but to the circumstance that, the annuity which he had enjoyed became extinct through
his death, and a new relation came into existence between the company and [the decedent's wife].
Id. This statement demonstrates a lack of understanding that the surviving spouse's relationship to the deceased's employer arose directly from the decedent's employment. Under such
arrangements the payments realistically are part of the employee's total compensation for
services rendered and are recognized as such by all concerned. To treat the spouse's payments as somehow new and separate from the employee's pay and employment relationship
ignores economic reality.
25. See, e.g., Estate of Salt v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 92 (1951), acq. 1952-1 C.B. 4.
26. See generally Kramer, supra note 2, at 349-50 (benefits not a result of generosity but
payment for services).

27. The estate tax has a number of sections requiring inclusion of property not owned
outright by the decedent, but which the decedent controlled or retained an interest.
See I.R.C. § 2036 (1976 9- Supp. II 1979) (dealing with transfers with retained life estates);
id. § 2037 (1976) (transfers taking effect at death); id. § 2038 (revocable transfers and transfers
where the decedent retained the power to alter or amend); id. § 2040 (1976 & Supp. III 1D79)
(joint interests); id. §'2041 (1976) (powers of appointment); id. § 2042 (life insurance). Under
all of these sections the decedent either holds substantial control over the property or retains
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reasonable: to include in a decedent's estate of property that was in reality
part of the wealth accumulated before his death. Although sparse, the section's
legislative history indicates that Congress was primarily concerned with inclusion of beneficiary annuities purchased either solely by the decedent's em28
ployer or jointly by the decedent and his employer.
Section 2039 requires inclusion in the estate if the annuity or other payment
was payable to the decedent, or the decedent had the right to receive such payment during his life.29 Congress obviously patterned this section after section
2036,30 which pertains to transfers with retained life estates. Section 2039's
language is almost identical to that of section 2036,31 although Congress' purpose in using similar language is unclear. The retention of a life interest is
the key concept of section 2036 and the very reason for its existence. A decedent
who has transferred property but retained a life interest has in reality made a
transfer logically taxable as though he owned the property in its entirety until
death. The retained life interest language of section 2036 neatly effectuates this
thinking. Section 2039, however, addresses the entirely different problem of a
decedent whose beneficiaries receive payments after his death under a retirement plan. While section 2036 depends upon the retained life interest concept, the pre-death payment requirement does not effectuate any policy of
section 2039. It may have come into existence merely because of a misguided
desire for symmetry between the sections or because most annuity contracts
provide for pre-death payments.
The Department of the Treasury first attempted to define section 2039's

a large enough interest before death to render it reasonable for Congress to require inclusion of
the property in the estate.

28. According to the Senate Committee Reports section 2039 requires inclusion:
[I]f under the contract or agreement an annuity or other payment was payable to the
decedent, or the decedent possessed the right to receive such annuity or payment,

either alone or in conjunction with another for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact
end before his death . . . . [T]he provisions of this section apply not only to cases
where an annuity was payable to a decedent but also to contracts or agreements under
which a lump-sum payment was payable to the decedent or the decedent possessed
the right to receive such a lump-sum payment in lieu of an annuity.

S. REP.,
29.
30.
31.

supra note 2, at 469-70. See also H.R. REP., supra note 2, at A314.
I.R.C. § 2039(a) (1976).
Id. § 2036 (1976 &Supp. 11 1979).
Id. § 2036(a) states:

The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of
any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in
case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for any
period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does
not in fact end before his death - (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to
the income from, the property, or (2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any
person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income
therefrom.
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scope in regulations adopted in 1958.32 Regulation section .20.2039l(a) notably does not limit the section's application to joint and survivor annuities. Rather, the regulation requires inclusion of any annuity or other payment receivable by a surviving beneficiary under certain agreements or plans
to the extent of contributions by the decedent or his employer. 33 Regulation
section 20.2039-1(b) further carries out this broad interpretation 34 by providing:
The term "annuity or other payment" as used with respect to both
the decedent and the beneficiary has reference to one or more payments
extending over any period of time. The payments may be equal or
unequal, conditional or unconditional, periodic or sporadic. The term
"contract or agreement" includes any arrangement, understanding or
plan or any combination of arrangements, understandings or plans
arising by reason of the decedent's employment. An annuity or other
payment "was payable" to the decedent if, at the time of his death, the
decedent was in fact receiving an annuity or other payment, whether
or not he had an enforceable right to have payments continued. The
decedent "possessed the right to receive" an annuity or other payment if,
immediately before his death, the decedent had an enforceable right to
receive payments at some time in the future, whether or not, at the time
of his death, he had a present right to receive payments.3 5
The section 2039 regulations effectively extend the section's scope beyond
Congress' major concern of traditional joint and survivor annuities. This
broad interpretation of section 2039 is reasonable if one considers only the
section's specific language. Section 2039(a)'s vague reference to an annuity or
32. T.D. 6296, 1958-2 C.B. 432.
33. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(a), T.M. 7416, 1976-1 C.B. 274, 275. The regulation states that:
A decedent's gross estate includes under 2039(a) and
other payment receivable by any beneficiary by reason
certain agreements or plans to the extent that the value
is attributable to contributions made by the decedent

(b) the value of an annuity or
of surviving the decedent under
of the annuity or other payment
or his employer.

Id.

34. The broad regulatory interpretation of section 2039 by may not be consistent with
the narrower purposes discussed in the section's legislative history. See S. REP., supra note 2,
at 123-24; H.R. REP'. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 74, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. Nws 5280, 5335-36. The regulations, however, may be defended as rational because they
appear consistent with the statute's language and with the general purposes of the estate tax
law. In any event, the taxpayers did not challenge the regulations' validity in early cases. See
Estate of Bahen v. United States, 305 F.2d 827, 835 (Ct. Cl. 1962) ('firmer legal basis provided
by the Regulations'). See also Estate of Beal v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 269, 271-72 (1966), acq.
1967-9 C.B. 1, where the Tax Court stated:
The purpose of this section, which is new in the 1954 Code, was to clarify prior law
as to whether a joint and survivor annuity ...to which both the decedent and his emHowever,
ployer made contributions, is includible in the decedent's gross estate ....
the broad language of the section goes beyond the precise situation which served as the
initial impetus for congressional action in this area."
Id. (Citing H.R. REt'. No. 1337, 88d Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1954)).
35. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(1) (1958). See infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
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other payment payable to the decedent before his death can be broadly interpreted. On the other hand, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress'
main purpose in enacting section 2039 was to include the value of annuities
arising from traditional retirement plans, in contrast to the broad application
adopted by the regulations.36 Even though traditional arrangements were
clearly most important to Congress, it is unclear whether Congress intended
to include only traditional retirement plans under the section. Courts have
been forced, therefore, to interpret a statute given broad scope by regulations
37
and narrow scope by its legislative history.
2039 UNDER
Bahen v. United States

DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION

The first case decided under section 2039 was Estate of Bahen v. United
States,3 8 a comprehensive and well reasoned opinion that has greatly influenced the development of case law. The decedent, Bahen, was an executive
who had rights under two compensation plans his employer established. 39 The
Court of Claims adopted the regulations' broad interpretation of section 2039
and included the beneficiary's payments in Bahen's estate.
The first plan that Bahen participated in was the Deferred Compensation
Plan, adopted by the company for forty of its high executives and officers.
Under this plan, the company paid a stated sum in sixty equal installments
to the employee's surviving widow and children. 40 The payments would have
been made whether the employee died before or after retirement.4 ' If the
employee became totally incapacitated before retirement, however, the payments would be paid to him in sixty equal installments with his widow and
children receiving unpaid installments at his death. 4? The decedent also participated in a Death Benefit Plan, adopted a year before the Deferred Com36. Taxpayers have not challenged the regulations as being overbroad and the regulations
have been accepted as valid in a number of cases. See, e.g., Estate of Schelberg v. Commissioner, 612 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1979); Estate of Bahen v. United States, 305 F.2d 827 (Ct. Cl.
1962).
37. See Estate of Beal v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 269, 271-72, acq. 1967-2 C.B. 1 (1966).
38. 305 F.2d 827 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
39. Id. at 828. Cases under § 2039 typically causing problems deal with high executives of
large corporations such as Bahen, who worked for the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway
Company. See, e.g., Estate of Schelberg v. Commissioner, 612 F.2d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1979) (IBM);
All v. McCobb, 321 F.2d 633, 634 (2d Cir. 1963) (Standard Oil Co.); Gray v. United States, 278
F. Supp. 281, 282 (D.N.J. 1967) (Socony Mobil Oil); Estate of Beal v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.
269, 269 (1966), acq. 1967-2 C.B. 1 (Western Electric); Estate of Barr v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.
227, 228 (1963), acq. in result, 1978-1 C.B. 1 (Eastman Kodak Co.). The other major type of
case presenting problems involves executives and owners of closely held businesses. See, e.g.,
Estate of Wadewitz v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 980, 981 (7th Cir. 1964); Silberman v. United
States, 333 F. Supp. 1120, 1121-22 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363, 1364
(Ct. Cl. 1969). Interestingly, low and middle level employees are not represented in the cases,
showing that the issues discussed here seem to apply only to executive employees, whether
employed by large or small businesses.
40. 305 F.2d at 828.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 828-30.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol34/iss5/2

8

Colliton: Conforming Section 2039 to the Goals of Estate Tax
1982]

SECTION 2039 AND GOALS OF ESTATE TAX

pensation Plan, that covered all company employees with more than ten years
of service who died while employed.4 3 Under this plan, the company would
pay a sum equal to three months' salary to the employee's widow or to the
44
guardian of any minor children surviving the decedent.
After Bahen's death, the company paid three months' salary to his widow
under the Death Benefit Plan and sixty monthly payments under the Deferred
Compensation Plan.45 The government asserted that these amounts should
have been included in the estate under section 2039 and other sections.46 The
Court of Claims first upheld the Treasury Regulations stating unless- they
violate the statute sought to be implemented, such regulations must be
accepted. 47 With regard to the Deferred Compensation Plan, the court
concluded the plan was a form of contract or agreement as required by the
statute. The court reasoned, "[a] compensation plan unilaterally adopted by
the employer, but made irrevocable and communicated to the employee, falls
directly within [the statutory] definition, at least where the employee continues
48
in the company's service after the adoption of the plan."
The Bahen court's rationale follows the Treasury Regulations49 and ,has
been adopted in other cases.50 The decision reasonably concluded there was a
contract or agreement under these facts since benefits under such plans are
part of both the employee's compensation and the employment agreement,
regardless of whether the employer and the employee specifically negotiated
the benefit terms. The employer clearly does not provide such pay benefits as
gifts or fringe benefits.
The next and more difficult question the court considered was whether
there was an annuity or other payment payable to the decedent before his
death under the Deferred Compensation Plan. 51 The court held the decedent's
right to have $100,000 paid in sixty equal installments if he became incapacitated was such an annuity under the regulations' broad definition. 52 The
Court of Claims reached this conclusion even though Bahen had never received any disability payment and his rights were contingent upon becoming
disabled., 3
43. Id. at 828.
44. Id. at 834-35.

45. Id. at 828-29.
46.

Id.

47. Id. at 829. Even though the taxpayers did not challenge the section 2039 regulations
as overbroad, such an argument would have been reasonable because of legislative history.
48.

Id. at 830.

49. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(1)(ii) (1958) (§ 2039 applies to agreements under which

decedent possessed right during life to receive payments).
50. See, e.g., All v. McCobb, 321 F.2d 633, 635-36 (2d Cir. 1963).
51. 505 F.2d at 830. Under the Deferred Compensation Plan, the Court of Claims decided
that there was a contract or agreement. The Plan also clearly involved an annuity payable
to the beneficiaries in the 60. payments to Bahen's wife. The critical issue therefore was
whether there was an annuity or other payment to Bahen before his death. Id.
52. Id. at 831.
53. Id. The court stated: "The Regulations make clear that, in circumstances like these,
the decedents interest in future benefits, even if contingent, is sufficent." Id.
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Section 2039 also required inclusion of the three months' salary paid to the
decedent's widow under the Death Benefit Plan, even though there was no
annuity or other payment payable to the decedent under this plan standing
by itself. 54 After first rejecting the idea that unpaid salary could be the necessary
annuity or other payment,5 5 the court decided that the possibility of disability
payments under the Deferred Compensation Plan satisfied the lifetime payment requirement for both plans. 5 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied
on the regulations' requirement that employee benefit plans are to be read
together. 57 The court upheld this requirement, stating that although the
evidence failed to indicate the plans were part of one scheme, "the statute
and the Regulation can establish a prophylactic across-the-board rule applicable to all cases, regardless of the purity of motivation in a particular instance."58
Bahen is significant because it considered several of section 2039's major
interpretative problems. First, although the taxpayers did not raise the issue,
the Bahen court upheld both the section 2039 regulations' broad interpretation of annuity or other payment. 59 Second, the case determined a contingent
right, while not a traditional annuity, may be a pre-death annuity or other
payment for section 2039 purposes. Third, Bahen concluded that benefit plans
may be read together.65 This results in inclusion of post-death benefits if there
are contingent lifetime rights under another plan. Bahen therefore resulted in
inclusion even though the two plans in question did not resemble a traditional
retirement annuity plan, regardless of whether they were read together or
separately.
Bahen's facts raised some of the most difficult problems in interpreting
section 2039 because it did not involve a traditional survivor's annuity. The
Bahen court's holding must be measured not only against section 2039's wording and legislative history but also against the general purposes and scope of
estate tax law. Bahen's result is consistent with those general purposes. The
decedent was an executive of a large corporation that agreed to make payments to his beneficiaries as deferred compensation for his services to the
corporation. Treating the value of the payments as includible property is
comparable to considering the payments as property clearly owned by the
decedent at death. Such property reasonably should be included in the decedent's estate.
Organizations do establish benefit programs such as in Bahen to compensate
54. Id. at 835.
55. Id. at 834-35. See also Estate of Schelberg v. Commissioner, 612 F.2d 25, 31 (2d Cir.
1979) (disability payments too dissimilar to annuities); Eichstedt v. United States, 354 F. Supp.
484, 491 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (same); Silberman v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (W.D.
Pa. 1971) (payment in form of compensation for services); Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d
1363, 1366 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (wages are not annuities).
56. 305 F.2d at 835.
57. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(2), ex. (6) (1958). See infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
58. 305 F.2d at 835 n.16.
59. Id. at 835. See also Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (1958).
60. 305 F.2d at 835. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(2), ex. (6) (1958).
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employees for their services.61 They establish these plans recognizing the
market place's economic realities, which require compensation and incentives
to keep executives productive and content. The benefits paid to Bahen's widow
clearly were not gifts from the company, but were compensation for the decedent's work. The decision simply includes in his estate compensation for
employment paid to a beneficiary. This result is fully consistent with the
purposes of the estate tax.
It is difficult, however, to reconcile Bahen's conclusion with the legislative
history of section 2039. The committee reports clearly show that the section is
primarily concerned with the inclusion of amounts paid under traditional retirement plans.62 While section 2039 does use the broad term "other payment' with respect to the requirement of payments during the decedent's life,
it is unclear whether Congress intended to include highly contingent payments
63
such as those in Bahen.
An early case, Estate of Wadewitz v. Commissioner,64 considered whether
the estate includes an amount forfeitable by the decedent's action before death,
but vested in the decedent's beneficiaries after death. 65 This question arises
when an employee has the right to have payments made to a surviving beneficiary, but the employee may forfeit the right by a voluntary act such as competing with his employer or resigning. In Wadewitz, the decedent had been
president of a company that agreed, among other things, to make payments
to certain beneficiaries for a specified period after decedent's death. 66 His
rights were to be forfeited if he competed with the company during his lifetime, but the company had no other right to withhold the benefits.6 7 The
Seventh Circuit concluded that the decedent's rights should be included in the
estate because his right to payments was entirely within his control through
the decision not to compete. Thus "he possessed an enforceable, nonforfeitable
right to future payments."' s
Wadewitz clearly held that a contingent, forfeitable right satisfies section
2039 if the decedent completely controls the contingencies. In other words,
when an employer promises that a beneficiary will receive payments, section
2039 requires inclusion if the right can be lost only by the employee's actions,
assuming that the arrangement meets other section 2039 requirements. If the
decedent has the power to control distribution to his beneficiaries, and no one
other than the decedent has that power, it is reasonable to treat the decedent
as the absolute owner of the right and to include its value in his estate. Treat61. See generally Kramer, supra note 2.
62. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
63. See Estate of Schelberg v. Commissioner, 612 F.2d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1979) (disability pay-

ments too contingent to warrant inclusion in gross estate). See also All v. McCobb, 321 F.2d
633, 635-36 (2d Cir. 1963) (following Bahen's decision of reading two employee benefit plans
together and finding a contract agreement).
64. 339 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1964).
65. Id. at 982. This issue was a problem under the 1939 Code. See generally Pincus, supra
note 2, at 864.
66. 339 F.2d at 981-82.
67. Id. at 982 & n2.

68. Id. at 983.
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ing such a right as the equivalent of the decedent's property is consistent with
the purposes of estate tax law.
In 1966 the Tax Court considered in depth the major question of whether
salary earned but unpaid at death was an annuity or other payment payable
0
to the decedent.69 In Fusz v. Commissioner,7
the decedent and his employer,
a corporation owned in part by the decedent, entered into an employment
agreement providing for certain payments to the decedent's wife upon his
death. Although the agreement provided that Fusz's regular salary and the
payments to his wife were consideration for his services, no post-employment
benefits were payable to Fusz or to anyone else. When Fusz died and the
corporation made the agreed payments to his widow, the government argued
that the payments should be included in his estate under section 2039. 7 1 The
Tax Court had to determine whether to classify the unpaid salary as a predeath annuity or other payment for section 2039(a) purposes.
The Tax Court in Fusz refused to accept the government's contention that
the payments should be included, holding instead that "the phrase 'other payment' is qualitatively limited to post-employment benefits which, at the very
least are paid or payable during decedent's lifetime." 72 In concluding that
compensation being paid to a working employee could not be an annuity or
other payment, the Tax Court observed that the government's argument
would require adopting two different meanings of the statutory language, "annuity or other payment." The court detennined that current compensation
cannot be simultaneously "payable to" and "receivable by" both the decedent
and a beneficiary and therefore concluded: "Respondent's construction would
convert 'an annuity or other payment was payable to the decedent' into 'any
payment was payable to the decedent.... .'" This analysis is puzzling because section 2039 does not require that only one payment or annuity be made
to the decedent and his spouse. Indeed, the statute specifically provides for inclusion if the decedent and the beneficiary each receive either an annuity, or in
the alternative, any other payment.
While the Tax Court's reasoning in Fusz, based on the history of section
2039, is attractive, it is difficult to reconcile with the underlying purposes of
the estate tax. Generally, estate tax is imposed when the decedent either
owned the property at death or had some substantial interest in the property
justifying inclusion.7 In Fusz, the decedent's spouse received payments arising
from an employment contract and paid as consideration for the decedent's
services. This property's exclusion is inconsistent with the goal of the estate
tax.7 r Realistically the payments to beneficiaries are consideration for services
69. This issue had previously been considered in Bahen where the Court of Claims held
that unpaid salary was not an annuity or other payment. 305 F.2d at 384-85.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
unpaid

46 T.C. 214 (1966), acq. 1967-2 C.B. 2.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 217.
See H.R. REP., supra note 2, at 90.
It is difficult to distinguish payments to beneficiaries from regular salary earned but
at death. The unpaid salary is clearly includible in the decedent's estate.
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aid should be treated the same as previously paid wages already deposited in
a bank.;
Even though Fusz may be inconsistent with general estate tax theory, it
appears consistent with section 2039's purposes and history. Neither the section,
its legislative history, nor the regulations discusses unpaid wages. Example
four in the legislative history-does imply that unpaid wages are a pre-death
payment by stating section 2039 applies to: "A contract or agreement entered
into by the decedent and his employer under which at decedents death, prior
to retirement or prior to the expiration of a stated period of time, an annuity
or other payment was payable to a designated beneficiary if surviving the decedent." 76 Because the example does not describe an obvious pre-death annuity or other payment, the government argued it must be unpaid salary. The
Tax Court reasonably rejected the government's contention by pointing out
that the legislative history focuses upon situations quite different than the
unpaid salary encountered in Fusz.7
While section 2039 arguably should have required inclusion under the
Fusz facts, the Tax Court nonetheless reached a reasonable conclusion. Clearly
Congress was primarily concerned with traditional retirement arrangements
and gave no specific attention to whether unpaid salary could be the necessary
pre-death payment. The government's reliance on example four is misplaced
because the example makes no specific reference to unpaid salary and probably
reflects, at most, a drafting oversight in the committee reports.78 Situations in
which a decedent has accrued unpaid salary at death are so common that it is
very unlikely Congress would require inclusion by the indirect means the
government asserted in Fusz. In any event, the Tax Court's Fusz conclusions
have become well-established and neither regular salary payments7 9 nor payments under wage continuation plans 0 cause section 2039 inclusion.
Later cases have adopted the Bahen and Fusz reasoning, although sometimes reaching contrary conclusions on the facts. Some cases have followed the
Bahen approach of reading different plans together in deciding whether the
76. H.R. REP., supra note 2, at A315. Accord S. REP., supra note 2, at 470.
77. The court cited the conference committee report in support of its conclusion:
This amendment amends section 2039 of the House bill by revising subsection (a) so as
to make it clear that the provisions of section 2039 apply not only to cases where an
annuity was payable to a decedent but also to contracts or agreements under which
a lump-sum payment is payable to the decedent or the decedent possesses the right to
receive such a lump-sum payment in lieu of an annuity.
H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 74, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
5335.
78. The fact that such an oversight occurred, however, shows that Congress was mainly
concerned with the requirement of a payment to a beneficiary rather than with the pre-death
payment. See Pincus, supra note 2, at 866-67.
79. See Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363, 1366 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Estate of Siegel v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 613, 619 (1980).
80. See, e.g., Estate of Schelberg, 612 F.2d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1979); Eichstedt v. United
States, 354 F. Supp. 484, 491 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Silberman v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 1120,
1126 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363, 1366 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Rev. Rul.
183, 1977-1 C.B. 274, 275.
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annuities or other payments required for 2039 purposes exist.,, Other cases
have followed Bahen and Fusz by determining that section 2039 applies only
to post-employment payments and does not require inclusion if the payments
are essentially salary or salary continuation payments.8 2
The Fusz conclusion that unpaid salary is not a pre-death payment to the
decedent raises the question of how to treat disability payments. An employee
typically has the right to receive payments if he becomes ill.s 3 If these payments
are viewed as salary for a current employee, then they are similar to the unpaid
wages in Fusz and do not satisfy section 2039(a)'s pre-death payment requirement. On the other hand, if the payments are viewed as post-employment
benefits, assuming section 2039's other requirements are met, the value of the
payments passing to a beneficiary will be included.
In Kramer v. United States,84 the Court of Claims dealt with the decedent-owner of a business who had agreed with his company that if he became
disabled, payments would be made to him during his lifetime in return for
his services as an advisor and counsellor. In that role, he was to assist the
officers and employees in formulating plans and programs for the business.8 5
The government contended this was a retirement arrangement giving Kramer
the post-employment benefit Fusz requires.86 The court held, however, that
the payments were essentially a substitute for salary, not an annuity or other
payment as defined in Fusz.8 7 In Kramer, as in Fusz, an employer made payments to the decedent's beneficiaries as compensation for the decedent's
services,88 without inclusion of the payment in the decedent's estate. This
value was excluded despite decedent's irrevocable contractual right to substantial payments. Once again, careful attention to section 2039's requirements
allowed a decedent to pass substantial amounts of property tax free.89
81. See All v. McCobb, 321 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1963); Eichstedt v. United States, 354 F.
Supp. 484, 492 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Gray v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 281, 284 (D.N.J. 1967);
Estate of Beal v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 269, 272 (1966), acq. 1967-2 C.B. 1.
82. See supra cases cited at notes 79-80.
83. Eichstedt v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 484, 492 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Silberman v. United
States, 333 F. Supp. 1120, 1126 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Kramer v. United States, 406 F.2d 1363, 136667 (Ct. Cl. 1969); Estate of Siegel v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 613, 624 (1980); Rev. Rul. 77-183,
1977-1 C.B. 274, 275.
84. 406 F.2d 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
85. Id. at 1364-65.
86. Id. at 1366. See also Estate of Siegel v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 613, 619-20 (1980).
This line of cases shows how the law in general, and particularly tax law, becomes complex.
Initially, § 2039 required inclusion if there is a pre-death annuity or other payment. Fusz
then held unpaid salary did not satisfy this requirement and there must be a post-employment
benefit. The court in Kramer added consideration of whether disability payments were postemployment benefits. This step-by-step series of questions and answers moved the courts
from simply looking for a pre-death annuity or other payment under the statute to deciding
whether a disability plan provides post-employment benefits. It is therefore not surprising
that tax law developed into a technicality-ridden legal nightmare.
87. 406 F.2d at 1367-68.
88. Id. at 1364. According to the court, the company agreed to make the payments because
Id.
"it was essential to the Company to have the benefit of Mr. Kramer's services ....
89. See also Estate of Siegel v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 613 (1980). In Siegel, the Tax Court
applied similar reasoning in refusing to include the value of payments to the decedent's
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AN ALTER ATivE TO Bahen:

Schelberg v. Commissioner
After section 2039 was enacted in 1954, the law under it developed in a predictable and consistent manner, based largely on the initial reasoning of
Bahen. In 1979, however, the Second Circuit in Schelberg v. Commissioner0
threw doubt on much of the previous analysis. Written by Judge Friendly, the
Schelberg opinion is a carefully drafted and reasoned examination of section
2039's language, purposes and case law development.
Schelberg was an employee of International Business Machines Corporation, which maintained a variety of employee benefit plans.91 One plan, the
Group Life Insurance Plan, included an unfunded and uninsured survivor's
income benefit providing for monthly payments to specified survivors.2 Under
this plan, Schelberg was to receive no payments before death. Read by itself,
therefore, the Group Life Insurance Plan did not satisfy section 2039's requirement of a pre-death payment to the decedent.
IBM also had a Sickness and Accident Plan entitling all full-time employees
to receive full salary while absent from work for a specified period because of
sickness or accident.9 3 In addition, IBM had a Disability Plan providing payments for totally disabled employees with no reasonable expectation of becoming able to work. The Disability Plan called for payments only after the
sickness and accident payments had expired. At the normal retirement date, an
employee receiving disability benefits would receive retirement benefits under
IBM's general retirement plan. Only 393 employees out of a total of 150,000
were receiving benefits under the Disability Plan. 94 It was therefore quite unlikely that Schelberg or any other individual employee would receive benefits
under the Disability Plan. When Schelberg died he was not, in fact, receiving
benefits under any of the plans although at his death his wife began receiving
the survivor's benefit. 95
The decedent had both the right to have his beneficiary receive the survivor's annuity and the highly contingent right to receive disability benefits
under certain circumstances 96 The value of the survivor's annuity therefore
could be included under section 2039 only by reading the plans together and
by designating the contingent disability payments an annuity or other payment
to Schelberg. The Schelberg facts are similar to Bahen's, and are unlike the
traditional annuity arrangements that are the main focus of section 2039.
The government argued under regulation section 20.2039-1(b)97 that the
children under section 2039. The Tax Court held the payments were not post-employment
benefits and therefore were not includible under the Fusz reasoning. Id. at 620.
90. 612 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1979).
91. Id. at 27.
92. Id. The Group Life Insurance Plan also provided for life insurance that was not at
issue in the case.
93. Payments were available for up to 52 weeks in any two year period. Id.
94. Id. at 28.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 28-29.
97. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (1958).
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98
Disability Plan and the survivor's benefit should be considered together. If
both plans were read together, the contingent disability payments would meet
the statutory requirement of an annuity or other payment to Schelberg, while
the survivor's benefit would be the necessary annuity or other payment to a
beneficiary. The contract or agreement would be satisfied because the employer communicated both plans to the employees as part of an employment
arrangement.
The Schelberg court first considered whether the contingent disability payments could be read together with the survivor's benefit. Regulation 20.2039l(b) provides "the term 'contract or agreement' includes any arrangement,
understanding or plan, or any combination of arrangements, understandings or
plans arising by reason of decedent's employment."9 9 Example six of the regulation section states "all rights and benefits" the employee or others receive
because of employment are to be construed together in determining section
2039's applicability and that "[t]he scope of section 2039(a) and (b) cannot be
limited by indirection."'100 The court interpreted these regulation provisions
to mean the Commissioner could consider "any combination" of arrangements
resulting from the decedent's employment. 01 ' The court reasoned, however, the
"mere possibility" of employee benefit from such a plan would not necessarily
satisfy section 2039(a)'s requirements, unless the plan also creates survivor's
benefits. 10 2 After acknowledging the Commissioner's right to read plans together in determining whether there should be section 2039 inclusion, the
court concluded that the decedent's rights under the Disability Plan were "too
dissimilar in nature from an 'annuity or other payment' and too contingent
to meet the conditions of section 2039(a)."' 13 The Schelberg analysis accordingly
requires a determination of whether payments to the decedent are similar to
04
annuities or other payments.
The payments in Schelberg were next analyzed in light of the congressional

98.

612 F.2d at 28.

99. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (1958).
100. Id. § 20.2039-1(b)(2), ex. (6) states:
The employer made contributions to two different funds set up under two different
plans. One plan was to provide the employee, upon his retirement at age 60, with an
annuity for life, and the other plan was to provide the employee's designated beneficiary upon the employee's death, with a similar annuity for life. Each plan was
established at a different time and each plan was administered separately in every respect .... The value of the designated beneficiary's annuity is includible in the employee's gross estate. All rights and benefits accruing to an employee and to others by
reason of the employment . . .are considered together in determining whether or
not section 2039(a) and (b) applies.
Id.
101.
102.
103.
104.

612 F.2d 25, 28, quoting Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (1958).
612 F.2d at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id. The court here misstates the question. The issue is not whether the rights are

similar to an annuity or other payment but whether the rights are an annuity or other
payment. The court apparently meant to determine whether the rights are similar to the
traditional annuities Congress focused upon in enacting § 2039.
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intent expressed in the legislative history. The court concluded Congress
intended the section to deal only with a joint annuity, not the whole gamut
of possible employer/employee arrangements. 10 5 This conclusion was supported
by pointing out that the instant situation did not represent the classic situation
of joint and survivor annuity presented by the examples used in the legislative
history. Although the term "other payment" is literally broad, Congress was
clearly referring to payments in the nature of annuities that would be includible in the estate if made to the survivor.106
The court concluded that Schelberg's facts should not lead to inclusion
under section 2039, because the contingency of qualifying for payments under
a disability plan should not be considered a pre-death annuity or other payment for section 2039 purposes. 07 The court added that such an interpretation
would be contrary to the congressional intent.0 8 Distinguishing Bahen on its
facts, the court stated the benefits there were more similar to the joint and
survivor annuities with which section 2039 was concerned. In addition, the
Second Circuit hinted that it might have decided Bahen differently0 9 In
general, the Schelberg court simply refused to require inclusion of payments
arising from situations far removed from the traditional annuity arrangement.
Schelberg questions the reasoning reflected in the majority of cases decided
under section 2039. It essentially rejects Bahen's view that a contingent payment to a decedent is a sufficient pre-death annuity or other payment when
occurrence of the contingency is unlikely.110 This view has subsequently been
approved outside the Second Circuit as recently demonstrated by Estate of Van
Wye v. United States."' Under similar facts,1 2 the Sixth Circuit relied on
105. Id. The court stated:

Both text and context show that [section] 2039 was conceived as dealing only with the
problem of what in substance was a joint annuity, although to be sure in all its various
ramifications, not with the whole gamut of arrangements under which an employee, his

employer or both may create benefits for the employee's survivors.
Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 33. The court stated:
[To consider a deceased employee[Is potential ability to have qualified at some future

time for payments under a plan protecting against total and permanent disability ...
as meeting the condition in section 2039(a) that there must be a contract or agreement

under which the decedent received or be entitled to receive "an annuity or other pay-

ment", is such a departure from the language used by Congress, read in the light of the
problem with which it was intending to deal, as to be at war with common sense.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 34. Estate of Wadewitz v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1964) was
distinguished because the payments in question arose from a single unitary plan. 612 F.2d at
33. The court distinguished Gray v. United States, 410 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1969) on the
ground that "[t]he decedent's rights to payments were thus not conditional upon such unlikely events as total disability, but merely survival until retirement age." 612 F.2d at 33.
110. 612 F.2d at 33. The court noted that contingency attributed to Schelberg had been
exercised by only a quarter of one percent of IBM employees. Id.
111. 686 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1982).
112. Id. at 426-27. Mr, Van lWye, a decedent, received sickness and accident benefits
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Schelberg to reject the Commissioner's attempt to treat disability and survivor
benefits under separate plans as a single annuity under section 2039.113 Quoting Judge Friendly's opinion, the court agreed the decedent's contingent,
future right to disability payments while alive were analogous to continued
wages and therefore not within the ambit of "annuity as other payment,"
under the Schelberg analysis.11 In Schelberg's wake, therefore, a sharp division
of authority exists on the question of what pre-death interest causes section
2039 inclusion.
While Schelberg's application of section 2039 appears consistent with the
section's language and legislative history, it is unclear what effect, if any,
Congress intended the section to have when specifically applied to this situation. At a minimum, Schelberg demonstrates that the section is difficult to
apply in situations beyond those Congress clearly considered. Schelberg, however, does not appear consistent with the general purposes of estate tax. The
transfer of property the decedent either owns or has substantial rights in is
generally subject to estate tax. Stepping back from section 2039's technicalities,
Schelberg involves an employee of a large corporation whose widow received
payments from the employer after her husband's death. The payments resulted
from the decedent's work as an executive and were clearly compensation very
similar to a salary. Realistically, in this sort of plan both the employer and
the employee consider such benefits compensation for the employee's services
and plan accordingly." 5 Schelberg effectively treats the widow's payment as
property not owned substantially by the decedent at death, which is inconsistent
with the reality of these compensation plans. Retirement and death benefit
plans are not gifts in any sense of the word but are clearly payments for
services. In a real economic sense, the decedent owns the benefits at death; to
treat them in any other mariner contradicts reality.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO HARMONIZE SECTION
WITH ESTATE TAX GOALS

2039

The state of the law under section 2039 is quite unsatisfactory with rewhich, if he had survived, could have commuted to disability benefits. A survivor plan
allowed the widow one percent of decedent's final monthly salary times years of service. Id.
at 426. As did Schelberg, Van Wye distinguished Bahen on its facts, finding the plan there had
allowed the widow to receive the disability benefits after decedent's death. Such a plan can be
considered a joint annuity within the scope of § 2039. Id. at 427 n.2.
113. Id. at 427. As the court stated: "We need not tarry long with the question presented
here for the Schelberg case ... is directly on point and appears to be clearly correct." Id.
114. Id. The court agreed with Judge Friendly that Congress did not intend "annuity or
other payment" to include wages or sickness and accident payments. Here the disability
payments would reflect sickness and accident rather than retirement benefits. Id. quoting
Schelberg v. Commissioner, 612 F.2d 25, 31 (2d Cir. 1979).
115. This sort of plan often arises from hard bargaining between employees and management, typically for the benefit of high executives of large corporations or the owners of
smaller businesses. In either situation, all involved parties understand when the employer
agrees to make payments to a survivor he gives up something of value and the employee receives something of value. The parties create agreements to make such payments after careful
consideration of the financial and business employment realities and the payments are clearly
not gifts or casual fringe benefits to the employee.
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spect to employee compensation plans that are not traditional joint annuities.
The well-established line of cases starting with Bahen reached conclusions
consistent with the general estate tax but difficult to reconcile with the statute's
language and legislative history. Bahen required inclusion even though the
decedent's pre-death rights were highly contingent. Fusz and Bahen established
the principle that an unpaid salary does not satisfy the pre-death payment
requirement. These conclusions, while consistent with the section's history and
language, allow part of a decedent's wealth to pass to beneficiaries tax free.
Schelberg re-examined the section's purpose and rejected the Bahen analysis.
Although apparently consistent with the history and specific purposes of
section 2039, the Schelberg decision allowed property to pass untaxed. These
decisions therefore leave the law in an unsatisfactory state. 16
The underlying problem is that section 2039 is poorly drafted. Specifically,
the pre-death annuity or other payment required by section 2039(a) results in
conclusions that are irreconcilable with both the section's purpose and
general estate tax principles. Because of this analytical conflict, some courts,
such as that in Bahen, have been forced to stretch section 2039's coverage
beyond congressional intent to reach a conclusion consistent with general
estate tax purposes. Other courts following Fusz and Schelberg view the requirement narrowly and thus deny inclusion. This narrow reading may be
consistent with the section's history, but it allows property the decedent actually owns to pass tax free. These inconsistencies result not from a failure of
judges, but from a failure of drafters.
This dilemma could be solved by simply eliminating the pre-death payment requirement from section 2039.11 7 If this were done, the value of an
116. Professor Kramer presented an example of how unequal treatment can result from
the pre-death payment requirement:
Under an employee benefit plan, an employee is entitled to a lump sum payment equal
to one-half the amount credited to his account under the plan upon reaching retirement
at sixty years, and may designate beneficiaries to receive the other half at his death,
after retirement; if he dies before retirement, the entire amount in his account is
paid his beneficiary. Two employees, -A and B, each irrevocably designate their wives
and children as beneficiaries. A dies one day before his sixtieth birthday. Since he had
a "right" at his death to the payment of one-half of his benefit, the entire lump sum
payment to his beneficiary is included in his gross estate under section 2039. B dies one
day after his sixtieth birthday. Since he no longer had any "right" to any payment at
all (having received his one-half before death) and is no longer receiving any payment,
the lump sum paid his beneficiary is not taxable under section 2039. And it is hard to
see how it can be taxed under any other section of the Code, unless B's designation of
the beneficiary was made in contemplation of death within three years of his death. B
had no life interest, no reversion, no power over or in the benefit paid the beneficiary.
Why should B receive such favored treatment over A here? Do we want to penalize A
because he died younger than B- this, indeed, is a queer philosophyl
Kramer, supra note 2, at 269-70. See also Pincus, supra note 2, at 865-68.
117. So amended, § 2039(a) would read: "The gross estate shall include the value of an
annuity or other payment receivable by any beneficiary by reason of surviving the decedent
under any form of contract or agreement entered into after March 8, 1931 (other than as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent)."
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annuity or other payment to a beneficiary would be included in a decedent's
taxable estate if it arose from a contract or agreement. The effect would be
simply that if a decedent entered into an agreement with his employer for payment to beneficiaries after the employee's death, the value of the payments
would be included in his estate. Section 2039 would then require inclusion of
compensation for the decedent's services that is realistically his property. 118
This amendment to section 2039 would have several effects. The value of
payments to beneficiaries under traditional retirement annuity plans would
continue to be included in the decedent's estate because these plans consistently
have a post-death payment to beneficiaries. Thus, the legislative history of
section 2039 and purposes of the estate tax would be upheld. In addition, the
Bahen result would be unchanged since that case dearly involved an annuity
or other payment to a beneficiary under a contract or agreement. Fusz, on the
other hand, would not be decided in the same way under an amended section
2039. The court would require inclusion of the annuity or other payment
because it arose from an agreement requiring a post-death payment. Schelberg's
facts would also require inclusion because once again there was an agreement for payments to beneficiaries. These results would be consistent with the
aims of estate tax since the payments were property the decedent earned
through his employment. 119 If there had been no pre-death payment requirement, the analytical struggle of both the Tax Court and the Second Circuit
would have been unnecessary, and Schelberg's facts would have required in20
clusion with little judicial difficulty."

Since Congress has shown no particular interest in revising section 2039,
however, courts will be forced to apply the law as it now stands. Although not
flawless, Bahen represents a better application of section 2039 than Schelberg
and should be followed. While Bahen's reasoning cannot be easily reconciled
with section 2039's legislative history, 12 it does not necessarily contradict congressional intent. Bahen does appear consistent with both the section's specific
118. Suggestions for this amendment have been made previously. See A.L.I., supra note 4,
at 46; G. COOPER, A VOLUNTARY TAx? 97 (1979); Dodge, Substantial Ownership and Substance
Versus Form: Proposals for the Unification of Federal Estate and Gift Taxes and for the
Taxation of Generation-Skipping Transfers, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 657, 701-02 (1976); Kramer,
supra note 2, at 389-96. Most recently, Dean Wolk examined the treatment of "pure" or
"naked" death benefits, benefits paid on the death of a decedent who had no lifetime benefit.
Wolk, supra note 2, at 278. He concluded pure death benefits should be taxable, even though
they are not now taxable under §§ 2033, 2035, 2037, 2038 or 2039. He then proposed
elimination of the pre-death payment requirement from 2039 to cause inclusion of these
benefits. Id. He also asserted that the IRS's current attempt to tax pure benefits as gifts is
inappropriate. Id. at 264-77.
In 1958 Meyer Pincus recognized that the pre-death payment requirement caused problems,
stating it "[s]hould play no part in the taxation of benefits payable to employee beneficiaries.
The employment relationship alone would seem sufficient to justify a tax, since that relationship is the generating source and provides the motive for the payment of benefits to the decedent's family." Pincus, supra note 2, at 870.
119. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
120. Indeed, the answer would have been clear under the Code and Schelberg probably
would not have been litigated.
121. See supra text accompanying note 62.
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wording and the Treasury Regulations promulgated under it. Bahen requires
inclusion of property that logically should be taxed to the decedent. In contrast,
Schelberg reaches a conclusion inconsistent with the purposes of estate tax
law, and therefore it is a less preferrable approach.
Schelberg's analysis is also weak because it recreates conceptual problems
section 2039 was intended to solve. Specifically, one reason for enacting sectiori
2039 was to eliminate the necessity of determining whether a property interest
passed to a survivingibeneficiary1 22 Before the section's enactment, if the rights
received on the decedent's death were not "property," their value could not
be included in the decedent's estate. Schelberg's analysis resurrected this determination, with all its problems. The Schelberg court's concern that the decedent's rights under the Disability Plan were highly contingent and unlikely
to occur-s was similar to pre-section 2039 analysis concerning whether a decedent's rights were vested.124 If Schelberg is followed, it will be impossible to
predict without litigation whether a decedent's pre-death rights are substantial
enough to satisfy the statutory requirements. Avoiding this unpredictability
originally prompted section 2039's enactment. 25
, The Bahen analysis, on the other hand, has the advantage of creating predictability. If the decedent has any pre-death rights to an annuity or other
payment, even if highly contingent, that element of section 2039 is satisfied.
In view of the fact that the pre-death right requirement is unnecessary from
a policy viewpoint, Bahen reaches the best result. 2
CONCLUSION
Section 2039 requires that an annuity or other payment be payable to both
the decedent before death and to his beneficiary after death, and further, that
these payments must arise from a contract or agreement. The most serious
problems involve the threshold payment-before-death requirement. Differing
interpretations of this requirement, best shown by the conflict between Bahen
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
123. 612 F.2d at 33.
124. See, e.g., Howell v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.-224, 227-31 (1950), acq. 1953-1 C.B. 4.
125. See generally Kramer, supra note 2; Pincus, supra note 2.
126. Since it was decided, Bahen has been cited in 27 later decisions and in six Private
Letter Rulings and Revenue Rulings. Although it would be unreasonable to assume Congress
recognizes every decision on an issue, Bahen is of sufficient importance and notoriety Congress
must have been aware of it. While the doctrine of congressional re-enactment is not overwhelmingly persuasive, it does reflect a common sense affirmation of the Bahen approach.
See Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 524 (1947) (holding the doctrine of legislative acquies-

122.

cence is at best an ancillary tool in interpreting ambiguous provisions). After all Congress has
never been reluctant to change tax law when it disapproves of judicial application. See, e.g.,
James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961). Prior to its decision in James, the Supreme Court
had ruled in Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 US. 404 (1946), that money taken by embezzlement
did not constitute income. When fifteen years passed without congressional adoption of the
Court's definition of income, the Justices reversed the Wicox holding. 366 U.S. at 221. The
Court took note that congressional reports indicated the statutory definition of income would
remain intact. Id. at 222. See also United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972); I.R.C. § 2036(h)
(1976 9- Supp. I 1979).
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and Schelberg, exist because section 2039's literal requirements cause decisions
that are contrary to the basic purpose of estate tax law.
The major purpose of the estate tax is imposition of tax on the transfer of
the decedent's property.' 27 Before section 2039's enactment, a number of cases
considered whether payments from an employer to a decedent employee's
beneficiary were sufficiently vested to require inclusion under the 1939 Code.'12
Congress intended section 2039 to eliminate this confusion by requiring inclusion of payments that could reasonably be considered the decedent's
property. 129 Later cases applying section 2039 focused on the section's specific
requirements without reconciling their results with estate tax law.
Section 2039's application to a traditional joint annuity fulfills the basic
goal of estate tax. In such cases, a beneficiary receives payments that have been
arranged as part of the employee's compensation. These benefits are equivalent
to paid wages and should be treated as property the decedent owned at death. 30
Inclusion in the decedent's estate of traditional survivor's annuities is reasonable and consistent with the basic structure of estate tax and section 2039.
The development of the law under section 2039 through decisions inconsistent with either general estate tax principles or the section's apparent
legislative purpose demonstrates the section was poorly drafted. These conflicting interpretations could be solved by the repeal of section 2039(a)'s pre-death
annuity or other payment requirement. Repealing this requirement would
result in the inclusion of both survivors' benefits under traditional retirement
plans, as Congress intended, and benefits similar to those in Bahen, Fusz and
Schelberg, as required by the principles of estate tax law. Absent such an
amendment, the Bahen analysis provides the better approach for courts to
follow, since it carries out general estate tax principles.
127. See C. LOWDNEs, R. KRAMER & J. McCoRD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXES 26 (3d
ed. 1974).
128. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
129. See supra text accompanying note 27.
130. However, it should be noted that Congress has chosen to exclude compensation paid
after the decedent's death if the payments arose under a qualified plan. I.R.C. § 2039(c)
(1976 & Supp. III 1979). Exempting such payments has been criticized on policy grounds. See
supra note 4. The Treasury Department attempted to convince Congress in 1969 that § 2039(c)
should be repealed
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